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Abstract. The paper analyses the underpinning factors of foreign direct investments 
towards the MENA countries. Our main interpretative hypothesis is based on the 
significant role of the quality of institutions to attract FDI. In MENA experience the 
growth of FDI flows proved to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU or in 
Asian economies, such as China and India.  
Our research, firstly, stresses three major factors for such a poor performance:  
i) the small size of local markets and the lack of  real economic integration; 
ii) the changes in the scenario of international competition; 
iii) economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly 
insufficient. 
Using the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) governance indicators, we examine 
the role of “institutional quality” on FDI  trough a regression analysis. Our analysis 
show as institutions play an important role in the relative performances of countries in 
attracting FDI. At last, data on institutional quality and business climate show the 
relative disvantages of MENA. Our paper suggests as MENA countries require  deep 
institutional reforms in order to improve the attractiveness in terms of FDI. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early nineties, economists have been paying a growing attention to 
the relationship between institutions and economic growth. Several studies show as 
“good institutions” can encourage private investments, improve the overall efficiency 
of the economic system and significantly contribute to the economic growth in the 
long run1. 
Along this strand of research, some studies have also been aimed at analysing 
the relationships between national institutional systems and the countries’ ability to 
attract foreign direct investments (FDI). The works of Globerman and Shapiro (2002), 
Stern (2003), Bénassy- Queré, et all. (2005) are some recent examples in this research 
field. These works have shown that, especially in developing countries and emerging 
economies, the quality of institutions and of the regulatory system operating in the 
economy, has a significant impact over inward FDI.  
Starting from a survey of the results obtained from existing literature, this 
paper explores FDI inflows in the MENA2, dwelling upon the features of their 
institutional systems. 
The analysis of MENA institutional systems appears to be particularly 
interesting. In the last decade, in fact, most of these countries has undergone profound 
economic and institutional reforms, aimed at improving macroeconomic stability, 
international openness and the development of the private sector. The signing of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement, along with a progressive elimination of 
trade barriers, have positively affected international trade relations in the area. 
However, high import tariffs and significant non-tariff barriers (especially those 
related to the bureaucratic and institutional machinery) still in existence, make the 
                                               
1
 By institutions in a broad sense, we mean the whole of the regulations, both formal and informal, as well 
as the framework of those incentives which shape individual behaviours. Institutions may be defined in a 
variety of ways, but we first need to distinguish  between political and economic institutions. The former 
include the rules of “the game of politics”, such as constitutional rules, election rules, limitations to the 
government activity and to other public bodies. The economic institutions may be regarded as the rules of 
“the game of economics”, played by economic operators, such as individual property rights, commercial 
laws, regulations concerning licensing, credit, the setting up of business enterprises etc. For a definition 
cf. North (1990). For the analysis of the role of institutions on economic growth cf. Hall and Jones 
(1999), Acemoglu et all. (2004), Eicher and Leukert (2006). 
 
2
 In this paper, we refer to the following countries: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Israel, Turkey. 
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region one of the most protected in the world (European Commission, 2003). In other 
words, more extensive reforms are needed if  the area is to become internationally 
competitive, particularly with regard to emerging economies, such as those of south-
eastern Asian and Latin American countries (Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 
2004). 
Over the last ten years, FDI have significantly increased both in absolute and 
relative terms. MENA countries’ performance, however, appears to remain distinctly 
below that of many other developing economies or emerging countries. In particular, 
the growth of FDI flows prove to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU new 
members (EEC)3 or in the big rapid growth Asian economies, such as China and India. 
Some studies show that, in the MENA, FDI disincentives are related to the 
macroeconomic context of the area, to the delays in reform implementation, to the 
poor quality of the institutional system, as well as to the political and social risks 
which are specific to some of those countries.   
In the following section, FDI trends in the MENA are compared with other 
economies, particularly with EEC. In the third section, the illustration of the growth 
performance and a general outline of MENA political and social background are 
followed by an empirical analysis of the relations between institutional variables and 
FDI. Some conclusive remarks make up the last section. 
                                               
3
 We refer to the ten countries joned at the EU in 2004, in particular to that of the Eastern 
Europe.   
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2. FDI in the MENA 
2.1. FDI worldwide distribution 
FDI increase is a major sign of globalization. Between 1980 and 2004, FDI 
flows in the world went from 55 to 648 billion dollars. The highest growth rate took 
place in the second half of the 90s; after which, the flows started decreasing. Rates 
recorded at the end of the period under consideration appear, however, to be distinctly 
above any previous ones. 
 
Figure 1. FDI inflows in Developing Countries, Africa, Latin America and Asia. Average 
1980-2004 (mill. $) 
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Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
 
 
Traditionally, FDI flows are directed towards developed country. Between 
1980 and 2004, developing countries (DC) received on average 28% of the world’s 
flows. However, the growth among DC varied to a great extent. Figure 1 shows FDI in 
three regions: Eastern Asia (including China), South America and Africa. It can be 
noted that FDI met with a major growth in the first two economies whereas the growth 
proved to be much more restrained  in Africa. As well as towards Asian emerging 
economies, during the last decade, a considerable FDI flow has been directed to 
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Central and Eastern European countries (EEC), new EU members. Data show that 
China’s and India’s rapid growth, some Latin American emerging countries (such as 
Brazil) and eastward EU expansion have deeply changed the scenario of the global 
competition, providing new investment opportunities for multinational companies. 
2.2 FDI in MENA 
From 1990 on, FDI grew significantly in the MENA: the flows increased both 
in absolute value and in terms of the fixed gross investments of the region. Figure 2 
shows the inflow trend in the MENA, in the 10 EEC countries and in China. 
Remarkable differences can be noted among the three economies under consideration. 
Between 1995 and 2004, the MENA received, on average, FDI for little more than 8 
billion US dollars, as against 17 billion dollars  of the new EU member countries. The 
MENA received 1,2% of the world’s total flow of FDI, China and India as a whole got 
8%, while 25 EU countries got around 43%. 
 
Figure 2. FDI inflows in the MENA, China and EEC 1979-2004. Millions dollars. 
 
Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
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Figure 3. FDI inflows in percentage of gross capital formation. 
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Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
 
As shown in Figure 3, FDI flow growth promoted capital accumulation in 
many countries: between 1990 and 2004, FDI went from 5 to 13,5% of fixed gross 
investments in the MENA, from 10 to above 40% in the EU, from 10 to 12% in China. 
Figure 4 shows as the increase in FDI flows recorded in the MENA can be 
mainly ascribed to two countries, Israel and Turkey, since the two of them alone got 
50% of the FDI. Between 1995 and 2004, Israel got 30% of the cumulated FDI flows, 
Turkey got 17% and Morocco 12%. On the other hand, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 
received less than 3%. With the exception of the two major economies – those with 
more developed and bigger internal markets – MENA’s capacity to attract investments 
proves to be absolutely marginal. 
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Figure 4. FDI inflows in the MENA. Averages 1980-95 and 1995-04 
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Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
 
Figure 5. FDI inflows to MENA e EEC – millions $ (average 1995-2004). 
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Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
 
Figure 5 compares FDI flows in the MENA with some Eastern European 
economies. The total amount of the flows (represented by the bubbles’ dimension) 
received  by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is notably above that of the MENA. 
In Israel (the most developed country in the region), flows are similar to those arriving 
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in Hungary; in Turkey, FDI values are in line with small-sized Slovakia; they remain 
considerably lower in the other countries. 
Figure 6 shows the data related to greenfield FDI projects. In the period under 
consideration (2000-2004), there was a significant increase in greenfield FDI in the 
MENA. In the three-year period, these countries were, as a whole, the recipient of 600 
investment projects. Projects topped 2000 in the EEC, around 3900 in the EU and 
4800 in China and India. Even in this case, MENA performance proves to be modest 
if compared to that of emerging or low income economies. These data are significant: 
the MENA region, in spite of low labour cost and its being so close to Europe, doesn’t 
seem to be able to provide incentives for delocalization. It is also worth noting that 
greenfield investments (mainly taking place in the Maghribi region) only affect a few 
traditional sectors: textiles, tourism, cement manufacture etc. (Radwan and Reiffer, 
2005). 
 
Figure 6. Number of greenfield FDI projects 2000-04 
 
Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
 
Table 1, finally, reports the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
carried out in the 4 regions between 1990 and 2004. it can be noted that most M&As 
take place in the industrial countries. Cross-country differences are remarkable: in 
terms of value,  M&As  carried out in the MENA turn out to be less than half those of 
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EEC and make up only 0,6% of the world total as against EEC’s 1,4% and 15 
countries of the EU. 
 
Table 1. M&A by economies 1990-2004 
Economies Millions $ % of the World Number of deals % of the World 
UE-15 2 344 913 44,1 29856 43,3 
EEC 71 933 1,4 2883 4,2 
MENA 32 844 0,6 740 1,1 
China 26 219 0,5 1110 1,6 
India 10 591 0,2 692 1,0 
Source: Calculations on Unctad data.   
 
In synthesis, research shows that there are at least three main reasons at the 
basis of this relatively low capacity of the MENA to attract investments: 
1. The small size of local markets and the lack of  real economic integration 
inside the MENA. As we shall shortly see, the economic dimension of the 
MENA is relatively small, while trade integration among the southern 
countries (the Agadir agreements between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Jordan) is not yet strong enough to enlarge the dimension of the potential 
market. 
2. The second reason may be traced back to the changes in the scenario of 
international competition. Eastward EU expansion along with the rapid 
growth of some big economies in Latin America, China and India, have 
provided new opportunities for international investors. As we have already 
seen, EEC and China have received substantial FDI flows, particularly 
greenfield investments. 
3. Thirdly, economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and 
mostly insufficient, while restraint of investments along with the inadequacy 
of its institutional and legal framework only add to the low attractive capacity 
of the region (Alessandrini, 2000; Radwan and Reiffers, 2005). 
 
3. Do institutions matter for FDI? 
3.1. Macroeconomic background 
From an economical perspective, the MENA are relatively small countries. 
The gross domestic product of the whole region equals 9% of the EU with 15 
countries, just below that of Spain. Excepted for Israel, the MENA rank among the 
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medium-low income countries. Per capita GDP in the region is, on average, 6,700 $ 
(PPP), that is 24% of the 15 European countries, with Syria hardly reaching 13%. The 
overall population is about 250 million inhabitants, more than half of which is 
concentrated in Egypt and Turkey (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. MENA basics indicators 2003 
 GDP (PPP)   Per capita GDP (PPP) Per capita GDP (PPP) 
in % UE 15 
Population  
(thousands) 
Algeria 183.637 6.107 22 31.833 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 252.094 3.950 14 67.559 
Israel 126.571 20.033 72 6.688 
Jordan 21.661 4.320 16 5.308 
Lebanon 21.557 5.074 18 4.498 
Libya .. .. 
.. 
5.559 
Morocco 113.909 4.004 14 30.113 
Syrian Arab Republic 58.727 3.576 13 17.384 
Tunisia 66.943 7.161 26 9.895 
Turkey 452.404 6.772 24 70.712 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005. 
 
Table 3. Growth in the MENA and in other economies 
 GDP (US $ 2000) GDP per capita (PPP) 
 1980-95 1995-03 1980-95 1995-03 
MENA 4,2 3,4 1,1 1,3 
EU15 2,1 2,0 1,9 3,0 
China 9,7 8,0 8,4 7,0 
India 5,4 5,7 3,5 3,9 
Source: Calculation on World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005. 
 
Table 3 shows the growth rates of aggregate and per capita GDP in the 
MENA, in the 15 EU countries, in China and India. After 1995, growth in the MENA 
slows down, going from 4,2 to 3,4%. Though remaining above that of the most 
developed European countries, it still is remarkably inferior to that recorded in the big 
emerging economies. The differences appear to be even more striking when we 
consider per capita growth. High birth rates in the MENA, in fact, result in a poor 
growth of per capita GDP, which equals about 1,3% yearly between 1995 and 2003. 
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Figure 7. GDP per capita (PPP constant 2000). 
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MENA average (left scale) and in percentage of  UE15 1980-2003 (right scale). Calculation on World 
Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.  
 
In the last twenty years, per capita GDP (PPP, constant $ 2000) in the MENA 
has increased by 1,3 times, going from 4,900 to 6,250 $. In the same period, in the 15 
EU countries, per capita GDP has increased by 1,7 times. The growth in the MENA, 
therefore, turns out to have been rather weak. As a result, the gap with the most 
advanced EU countries has increased: as shown in Figure 8, per capita GDP in the 
MENA has gone from 31 to 24% of the average 15 EU countries. 
Figure 8 illustrates some results of the growth accounting exercise drawn from 
the work of  Bosworth and Collins (2003). Their data show that international 
differences in the growth of the product per employed are mainly explained by 
differences in the TFP (total factor productivity) growth. Even in this case, differences 
between the MENA and other economies appear to be striking. In the MENA, TFP 
growth has been, on average, relatively low and, for many countries, even negative. 
TFP increase is very important: besides explaining the growth differentials, it also 
points out inefficiencies in the functioning of the economic system in most countries 
under consideration. We can also see that in industrial countries and emerging 
economies (China in particular), TFP accounts for a relevant share of the productivity 
growth. 
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Figure 8. TFP growth for selected economies 1980-90 and 1990-2000 
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Source: Calculation on Bosworth and Collins (2003).  
 
With reference to the Arabian countries, Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2003) point 
out that  low TFP growth shows ineffectiveness of investments due to three 
fundamental causes: social and political instability; excess of regulations and the 
presence of heavy public intervention discouraging private investments; poor quality 
of the human capital. As expected, these factors affect in the negative both domestic 
and (more even so) foreign investments. 
 From the late eighties on, many countries in the MENA started 
macroeconomic stabilization policies and structural adjustments4. These policies took 
different paths and their outcome was different, too. In general, the programs 
supported by the FMI (International Monetary Fund) provided for the reduction of  
subsidies to the private sector and of public expenditure, international trade 
liberalization, reform of the exchange rate systems, the loosening of restrictions on 
foreign investments, the privatization of some public enterprises, the consolidation of 
the legal system efficiency. Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan – lacking in natural 
resources – were among the first few countries to set out on a market-oriented 
                                               
4 Egypt started macroeconomic stabilization programs in 1991; Algeria in 1994; Israel in 1985; Syria and 
Jordan in the early 90s; while the structural adjustment was significant in Jordan, reforms were much 
slower and less incisive in Syria (European Commission, 2003), IMF, Regular Staff Reports on 
Mediterranean Countries, various years. 
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economy, and also among the first few to endorse the Euro-Med agreements. Tunisia 
and Morocco endorsed the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade while Jordan 
subscribed to an open trade agreement with the United States. Morocco reformed its 
taxation system, took measures aimed at the liberalization of the financial system and 
started privatization programs. 
 
Table 4. Inflation average in the MENA countries 
 1980-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04 Standard Deviation 
Algeria 9,1 24,4 10,4 2,4 9,4 
Egypt 17,9 14,6 5,7 3,8 7,3 
Jordan 6,1 3,0 2,7 2,0 5,4 
Lebanon 95,9 47,0 5,2 1,1 99,7 
Libya 8,8 9,4 3,2 -4,9 6,6 
Morocco 7,4 6,2 2,6 1,7 3,6 
Syria 22,6 11,2 1,7 1,6 15,5 
Tunisia 8,5 5,9 3,7 2,8 2,9 
Turkey 52,1 77,1 76,6 37,8 25,3 
Israel 119,4 13,5 7,0 1,6 96,4 
MENA 34,8 21,2 11,9 5,0 15,6 
Source: Calculation on FMI, WEO, 2005. 
 
In Egypt and Lebanon, reforms were slower and less effective. In Egypt, the 
macroeconomic stabilization policies of the nineties were followed by the introduction 
of trade restrictions. In Algeria – where the repercussions of the oil price fall-off were 
particularly heavy – reforms were limited. In particular, the trade reforms which had 
been started in the early nineties, met with a standstill in 1998 and were taken up again 
in 2001, after the subscription of the Euro-Med agreements. Investment liberalization, 
which was started in 1991, has proved to be insufficient even in Syria. On the other 
hand, Syria and Algeria also have to face strong banking restrictions as well as a 
virtually total control by public banks. In all the countries, reforms resulted in a 
significant inflation decrease and in a greater macroeconomic stability. Adjustment 
policies and the Euro-Med agreements have led to a slow reduction of trade 
restrictions. In these countries, nevertheless, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers still 
remain very high. For example, in Morocco and Tunisia, the average tariff equals 33 
and 30%, that is more than twice that of medium and low income countries. In Egypt, 
it equals 21%. Non-tariff barriers, though slowly decreasing, remain nevertheless 
significant. In Tunisia, import licences have been replaced by administrative barriers – 
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cahier de charge; in Morocco, technical controls and quality standards put a curb on 
imports (World Bank, 2003b). 
3.2. Instability and conflicts 
Instability, social and political tensions, conflicts and the risks of terrorist 
attacks make up strong deterrents to foreign investments. The relevance of such risks – 
particularly involving the emerging and developing economies – has been proved both 
by empirical research and by the surveys which have been carried out by international 
investors (Brink, 2004; AT-Kearney, 2004). 
Many of the MENA countries suffer from a climate of instability and 
conflicts: such countries as Algeria, Libya, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, for different 
reasons, have gone through – and in many cases still are going through – extended 
periods of violence or social and political tensions; the Mashrek region is not only 
affected by internal conflicts, as is the case with the Israeli-Palestinian war, but also by 
the climate of instability deriving from the Iraqi conflict. 
During the eighties in particular, the Middle East was marked by dramatic 
events which gave rise to major conflicts. The most important among these were the 
assassination of Sadat, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon which gave way to a 15-year 
war between Hizb-Allah and the Israeli army, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These 
conflicts decreased during the nineties, until the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 
2000 added to the instability of the area. In the Maghribi region, in Algeria, after the 
1992 coup d’état, there was an uninterrupted succession of massacres and terrorist 
attacks (Schmidt di Friedberg, 2003).  
During that period, some radical groups such as the Groupes Islamiques 
Armés (GIA) and the Armé Islamique de Salut (AIS) started to gain ground in the 
region. In 1995, president Zerual started  a harsh repression which resulted in ever-
increasing violence. According to some estimates, the number of the dead topped 
100.000. Other  massacres followed in 1997, in 1998 and 2000.  
Table 5 is a brief taxonomy of non-violent (intensity 1 and 2) and violent 
conflicts (intensity 3 and 4) at work in the MENA area in 2005. 
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Table 5. Conflicts on Middle-East and Maghreb 2005 
Name of conflict  Conflict parties Conflict Item(s) Start Int.*  
Algeria (Berber) RCD, CIADC, FFS vs. 
government 
Autonomy, system, ideology 1919 2 
Algeria (Islamist 
groups) 
Various religious groups vs. 
government 
National power, ideology - 
system 
1919 4 
Egypt (Islamist 
group) 
Muslim Brotherhood, 
Gaamat al Islamiya, al-Waad, 
al Jihad vs. government 
National power, ideology - 
system 
1992 3 
Egypt - Sudan Egypt vs. Sudan Territory resources (oil) 1958 1 
Iraq-Israel Iraq vs. Israel System/ ideology, international 
power  
1948 1 
Iraq - Syria Iraq vs. Syria System / ideology 2003 2 
Israel – Jordan 
(West Bank)  
Israel vs. Jordan Territory (West-bank) 1967 1 
Israel (Hezbollah) Hezbollah vs. Israel Territory (Shebah Farms) 1982 4 
Israel (Palestinian 
Groups) 
PLO. Palestinian Authority, 
Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, 
Hamas vs. Israel 
Secession, ideology - system 
resources 
1920 4 
Jordan - Israel Jordan vs. Israel  Resources (water) 1945 1 
Lebanon-Israel Lebanon, Hezbollah vs. 
Israel 
Resources (water) 2001 1 
Lebanon (religious 
groups) 
Religious groups vs. 
government 
National power 1975 3 
Libya – USA, Lybia vs. USA,  International power 
(disarmament) 
1964 2 
Morocco (Western 
Sahara) 
Frente Polisario vs. 
Government 
secession 1975 3 
Syria-Israel Syria vs. Israel Territory 1967 2 
Syria - Lebanon Syria vs. Lebanon International Power 1976 2 
Syria - USA USA vs. Syria International power 
(disarmament) 
2003 2 
Turkey (Kurds) Kurds vs. government Autonomy 1920 4 
Turkey – Iran Turkey - Iran International power 1979 2 
Turkey - Iraq Turkey - Iraq International power 1979 2 
Turkey - Syria Turkey - Syria International power 1979 1 
*) Level of intensity in 2005: Non violent conflicts: 1): Latent conflict; 2) Manifest conflict; Violent 
conflicts: 3) Crisis; 4) Severe crisis; 5) War. Source: Heidelberg Institute on International Conflicts 
Research (2005).  
 
There are several indicators for the political, economic and social risks and 
many of them are also related to the specific features of the national institutional 
systems (for a survey, see Brink, 2004). Among the most widely used risk indicators is 
the one worked out by the Political Risk Service Group (PRS). Figure 9 points out a 
significant correlation between the PRS index and FDI  inflows5.     
The impact of political risk factors taken into consideration in the PRS index 
concerning FDI has been explored in the work of Busse and Hefeker (2005). By 
means of a cross-country analysis over a 20-year period, Busse and Hefeker show that 
a government’s stability, internal and external conflicts, as well as non-insurable risk 
                                               
5
 The index was recalculated in such a way as to associate higher values to a higher risk. 
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components are basic determinants of FDI6. Not only do such phenomena cause a rise 
in investments risks, but they also tend to increase the volatility risk itself thus making 
investment planning very difficult. Chan and Gemayel (2004, p.14) illustrate the way 
this happens: the instability of risk indices provides a better fit than the indices 
themselves when explaining the ratio of FDI to GDP over time for MENA countries. 
(…) Policies designed to stabilize investment risk should help MENA countries to 
attract FDI. Such policies could include measures to improve the regulatory 
environment, reduce currency and financial risk, and avoid political and social 
instability. 
 
Figure 9. Risk index and FDI inflows (in log) 
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Source: Calculation on PRS and UNCTAD data (2005).  
 
3.3. The role of institutions  
Since the early nineties, ample research has been aimed at exploring the role 
of institutions in economic growth. These studies show that effective enforcement of 
civil and property rights, economic freedom, a regulatory system which can stimulate 
private investments along with low corruption levels, never fail to bring about greater 
development and higher growth rates. The causal relationship between institutions and 
                                               
6
 That is factors related to the risk of investments that are not covered by other (financial and economic) 
risk components, such as contract viability (expropriation), profit repatriation or payments delays 
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per capita GDP has been examined by some authors. What we really need to 
understand, in fact, is whether it is institutions that can favour development or 
whether, on the contrary, it is  higher  development standards which can stimulate the 
making of  good institutions. The question is still a matter for debate. However, in the 
works of Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et all. (2004), Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2003), ample evidence is given to support the idea that it is institutions that can 
stimulate development rather than the other way round. 
Alongside this strand of research, economists have been analyzing the 
relationships between institutions and FDI. These studies pinpoint the different ways 
in which institutions can affect FDI inflows. In the first place, the presence of good 
institutions tends to improve factor productivity thus stimulating investments; 
secondly, good institutions cause a reduction in investment-related transaction costs 
(such as corruption-related costs); finally, since FDI, especially the greenfield type, 
involve high sunk costs, they are affected by the insecurity resulting from social and 
political instability, by the degree of enforcement of property rights and by the 
effectiveness of the legal system (Stern, 2003; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and 
Kraay, 2001). 
Among recent studies, Bénassy-Quéré et all. work (2005) has explored the 
role which the institutional environment plays on FDI, by means of various 
econometric techniques (including instrumental variable regressions)7. The authors 
provide ample evidence to support the theory by which institutions do matter whatever 
the countries’ development level (estimated in per capita GDP). The results of this 
research can be summarized as follows: public efficiency in a broad sense is a major 
determinant of inward FDI. This includes tax systems, ease to create a company, lack 
of corruption, transparency, contract law, security of property rights, efficiency of 
justice and prudential standards. 
The work of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) examines the connection between 
those variables which are indicative of the national institutional systems and FDI in 
144 countries. Among other results, the work illustrates the way FDI are affected by 
institution standards. In particular, the authors come to the conclusion that “political 
governance matters, and improved political governance does not necessarily oblige 
governments to make large investments of taxpayers’ money (…..) Indeed, improved 
                                               
7
 In this paper, authors use the Institutional Profiles database, constructed by the French Ministry of 
Finance for 52 countries and referring to 2001. 
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governance might be more consistent, in many cases, with a smaller economic and 
regulatory role for governments. Improved political governance leads to increased 
inward FDI especially for smaller developing countries” (Globermann and Shapiro 
2002:42). 
There are several indicators of the institutional efficiency. Box 1 summarizes 
the most widely used among them. 
 
  Box 1. Measuring institutional quality 
 
• Index of Economic Freedom: This index is provided by Heritage Foundation 
for 161 countries. To measure economic freedom and rate each country, 50 
independent variables have been considered. These variables fall into 10 
categories of economic freedom. Each country receives its overall economic 
freedom score based on the simple average of the 10 individual factor score. 
Each factor is graded according to a unique scale. The scale runs from 1 to 5. 
A score of 1 indicates an economic environment or a set of policies that are 
most conducive to economic freedom; a score of 5  signifies a set of policies 
that are least conducive to economic freedom.  
• Fraser Index: Covers five areas: Size of governments; Legal structures and 
security of property rights; Access to sound money; Freedom to trade 
internationally; Regulation of credit, labour and business. For the year 2003: 
127 Countries; Average score: 6,4; minimum 2,8; max  8,7.  
• Institutional profiles: This database was elaborated in 2001 by the French 
Ministry of Finance that conducted a detailed survey on institutions through 
its foreign network in 52 countries. The IP database was constructed on the 
basis of 330 elementary questions concerning public institutions, capital 
market, goods market and labour market. The database is described in 
Berthelier et all., 2003; Quéré et all. (2005) apply the IP data to analyse the 
impact of institutions on FDI.  
• World Bank Governance Indicators: The WB Governance Indicators have 
been developed by Kaufmann, Kraay e Mastruzzi (2005). These indicators 
cover the period 1996-2004 and six dimensions of governance: 1) voice and 
accountability - measuring political and civil rights; 2) political instability and 
violence: measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in 
government; 3) government effectiveness: measuring the competence of the 
bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; 4) regulatory burden – 
measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies; 5) rule of law: 
measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence; 6) control of corruption – 
measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty 
and grand corruption and state capture. The six governance indicators are 
measured into units ranging from about -2,5 to 2,5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance. For the year 2005, this index was 
available for 209 countries and territories.  
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The majority of the literature on institutions and FDI focus on the institutions 
in the host country. The Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) database is 
particularly adapted to analyse the role of institutions, since it is based on several 
hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 
data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. Figure 10 show the correlation 
between four governance indicators and FDI inflows in 156 countries. The 
correlations appear to be relevant for each indicator.  
  
 
Figure 10. FDI inflows 1995-2004 and some governance indicators 
 
 
In order to assess the role of institutions on FDI, we have conducted a 
regression analysis for 129 countries. We have regressed FDI inflows (calculated as 
average for the period 1995-2004) on a set of explanatory variables: real GDP growth; 
a proxy of infrastructural endowment, provided by telephone mainlines for 1000 
inhabitants; a proxy of the development level, on the basis of energetic consumption 
per capita; and six indicators of institutional quality drawn from the database of 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). Considering that the institutional indicators 
are highly correlated with each other we have put each one of them, individually, in 
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the base equation in which the first three variables are held constant. After testing 
multicollinearity by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF), which values are 
smaller to the critical ones,  we estimated the following equations:  
 
ln(FDI inflowsi) = β1 + β2(GROWTH) + β3(lnINFRi) + β4(lnENERGi) + 
+ β5(INSTi) + u 
 
The regression output is presented in Table 6. The estimation results were 
robust, with satisfactorily adjusted R2 values. It is worth noting that all the variables 
indicating institutional quality are significant, with the exception of political 
instability. The signs obtained are, as expected, positive. It can also be noted that in 
the set of base variables taken into consideration, only per capita energetic 
consumption (approximating the level of economic development) turns out to be 
always significant. 
 
Table 6. The role of institutions in the host country 
 Dependent variable ln(FDI average 1995-2004) 
 Real GDP 
growth 
Log Infr Ln Energy use* Institutions Adj. R2 
Voice and accountability 0,09 0,24 0,45 0,53 0,48 
  (1,39) (1,60) (3,70)* (2,84)*   
Political Stability 0,07 0,48 0,38 0,03 0,45 
  (1,09) (3,15)* (3,07)* (0,14)   
Government 0,05 0,15 0,38 0,74 0,51 
  (0,71) (1,02) (3,32)* (3,92)*   
Regulation 0,06 0,17 0,43 0,77 0,52 
  (0,89) (1,19) (3,68)* (4,09)*   
Law 0,06 0,24 0,37 0,59 0,49 
  (0,99) (1,60) (3,12)* (3,03)*   
Control of corruption 0,05 0,21 0,42 0,61 0,50 
  (0,76) (1,45) (3,60)* (3,47)*   
Observation 129. Detected multicollinearity with VIF calculation. T-statistic in parentheses. * Significant at 95% level.  
 
Then we have utilized the principal component analysis (PCA) in order to 
calculate a new variable, named “Institutional efficiency”. The PCA method allow us 
to obtain the first principal component (FPC), that is the component of variables that 
explains the greatest amount of variation. Table 7, shows the weight of each variable 
in the first principal component while Fig. 11 displays the correlation circle between 
the variables and the FPC. It is possible to note as the correlation are all positives with 
the first factorial axis, with “political stability” the less correlated variable. 
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Table 7. Variable’s weight in FPC 
Variable FPC 
Voice and accountability 0,39 
Political stability 0,37 
Government 0,43 
Regulation 0,40 
Law 0,43 
Control of corruption  0,42 
 
Figure 11. Correlations circle variable-axes F1-F2 Factorial plane 
 
 
We run a second regression including in the base equation the new variable 
“institutional efficiency”. The regression’s output is presented in Table 8. The variable 
efficiency is significant (3,47) and the sign of the coefficient is positive. As expected, 
higher institutional efficiency has a positive impact on FDI. Figure 12 displays the 
factorial plan and the position of each country as regards the first principal component.  
 
Table 8. Regression on Institutional efficiency 
  Coefficients Standard Error T Stat F 
Intercept 2,72 0,67 4,05 0,0001 
Real GDP growth 0,06 0,06 0,88 0,3831 
Ln Telephone 0,16 0,16 1,00 0,3206 
Ln Energy 0,42 0,12 3,58 0,0005 
Institutional efficiency  0,30 0,09 3,47 0,0007 
Adj. R2 0,50. Obs. 129. OLS.  
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Fig. 12.  Factorial plane - Institutional efficiency  
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Table 9 illustrates the rank of the MENA countries, for each governance 
indicators, in the international classification (209 countries). It is possible to see as in 
these countries are the quality of governance is in general very bad, except for Israel 
that obtain the best score for each governance indicator.     
 
Table 9. MENA governance indicators (ranked) 
  Voice 
accountability 
Political 
stability 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
quality 
Rule of law Control 
corruption 
Algeria  160 192 133 173 152 124 
Egypt  166 157 107 154 97 105 
Israel  85 177 41 62 55 49 
Jordan  149 116 79 95 84 70 
Lebanon  155 161 121 142 117 127 
Libya  203 112 157 197 145 175 
Morocco  142 126 92 120 101 93 
Syria  201 151 153 187 122 153 
Tunisia  171 101 64 118 89 78 
Turkey  123 144 89 110 96 106 
Rank on 209 countries and territories. Year 2004. Source: Calculation on Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). 
 
3.4. Bureaucracy and business climate 
Empirical analysis shows that the regulatory framework and the bureaucratic 
system affecting the business climate have a direct influence on FDI. For instance, a 
study conducted by the World Bank (2003) across 69 countries shows that the time 
spent by managers dealing with bureaucracy to obtain licences and permits is 
associated with lower levels of FDI, after controlling for market size, human capital 
and macroeconomic stability.  
   The recent publication by the World Bank of the indicators contained in the 
“Doing Business” database provides an objective and comparable measure of the 
regulatory framework ruling enterprise activities and of its enforcement in 145 
countries (World Bank, 2005). Indicators are briefly summarized in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Indicators of the “ease of doing business” ranking  
 
 From an empirical point of view, the impact of government  regulation of 
business on FDI has been examined by Busse and Groizard (2006). By means of five 
indicators contained in the Doing Business database, and by applying the analysis to a 
sample of 89 countries, Busse and Groizard prove that economies with  high 
regulation standards (as measured through the indicators considered) draw 
comparatively less benefit from the presence of multinational firms. Their research 
supports the idea that  international trade and foreign investments only stimulate 
growth in those countries which have “better” institutions and lower levels of business 
regulation. 
   The implications of this study are remarkable. As pointed out by the authors: 
“Any attempts by government to attract capital in the form of foreign direct 
investment by offering special tax breaks are not likely to yield the expected beneficial 
effects if the regulatory quality and liquidity of financial markets, host countries have 
to reform their fundamental framework for regulations to enhance chances that FDI 
inflows can contribute to higher growth rates” (Busse and Groizard, 2006:21).  
   Table 11 reports some indicators of the bureaucratic and administrative 
effectiveness in the MENA and other countries (including China and India). The index 
shows that the MENA rank very low in a list of 155 countries. Differences are 
particularly  remarkable between the MENA and the new members of the EU. With 
the exception of Israel (29th on the world list), the business climate indicators show 
Starting a business: procedures, time cost and minimum capital to open a new business 
Dealing with licences: procedures, time and cost of business inspection and licensing  
Hiring and firing workers: difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of hours index, difficulty of firing index, 
hiring cost and firing cost 
Registering property: procedures, time and cost to register commercial estates 
Getting credit: strength of legal rights index, depth of credit information index 
Protecting investors: indices on the extent of disclosure, extent of director liability and ease of 
shareholder suits 
Paying taxes: number of taxes paid, hours per year spent preparing tax returns and total tax payable as 
share of gross profit 
Trading across borders: number of documents, number of signatures and time needed to export and 
import 
Enforcing contracts: procedures, time and cost to enforce a debt contract 
Closing business: time and cost to close down a business and recovery rate 
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that there are regulations operating inside the MENA which make business activity 
expensive and difficult to carry out. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the underpinning factors of foreign direct investments in 
the MENA countries. The main interpretative hypothesis is based on the significant 
role of the quality of institutions to attract FDI.  
Data show as in MENA experience the growth of FDI flows proved to be 
notably inferior to that recorded in the Eastern European Countries (EEC) or in Asian 
economies, such as China and India.  
Our research, firstly, stresses three major factors for such a poor performance:  
• the small size of local markets and the lack of real economic integration; 
• the changes in the scenario of international competition; 
• economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly 
insufficient; 
• the instability of macroeconomic and political framework. 
Secondly, we have examined the role of institutions on FDI, using the dataset 
developed by Kaufman and Kraay (2005) that contains six indicators covering 
different dimension of governance. Utilizing the principal component analysis (PCA), 
we build up a new variable, that we called “institutional efficiency”, in order to 
evaluate the role of this variable on FDI. The regression analysis, on a sample of 129 
countries, show as this variable affect significantly FDI inward. Our results point out 
institutional quality as a major determinants of FDI. This includes, in particular, voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and 
control of corruption. All the indicators of governance and institutions (including 
business climate ones) show the relative disvantages of the MENA countries, in 
particular in comparison with the EEC. The paper suggests as institutional and legal 
reform are fundamental steps to improve the attractiveness of MENA in terms of FDI.  
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Table 11. Ease of doing business. Ranked.  
Economy Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
Starting a 
Business 
Dealing with 
Licenses 
Hiring and 
Firing 
Registering 
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Closing a 
Business 
Lithuania 15 37 16 93 2 36 61 31 31 7 29 
Latvia 26 26 47 103 89 26 40 83 62 15 11 
Israel 29 12 83 58 134 12 6 97 11 103 38 
Slovak R. 37 48 40 74 6 28 118 69 60 81 44 
Czech R. 41 77 87 60 57 21 68 70 24 21 101 
Hungary 52 72 119 85 96 24 84 98 38 31 50 
Poland 54 92 120 64 75 88 22 106 34 104 23 
Tunisia 58 40 88 101 67 102 133 64 53 6 31 
Slovenia 63 78 48 133 88 57 46 77 63 85 69 
Jordan 74 119 59 68 104 65 124 15 61 58 70 
China 91 126 136 87 24 113 100 119 48 47 59 
Turkey 93 46 137 141 49 103 75 66 95 37 125 
Lebanon 95 99 90 49 85 66 102 43 94 142 98 
Morocco 102 50 125 124 58 146 117 126 98 29 51 
India 116 90 124 116 101 84 29 103 130 138 118 
Syria 121 135 78 94 76 124 105 42 146 149 65 
West Bank  125 152 76 75 86 129 .. 96 75 88 155 
Algeria 128 109 100 96 138 138 97 149 84 131 46 
Egypt 141 115 146 140 129 142 114 87 70 118 106 
Source: World Bank. 
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